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ANATOMY OF AN ABERRATION: AN EXAMINATION
OF THE ATTEMPTS TO APPLY ANTIRUST LAW
TO MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL THROUGH
FLOOD V. KUHN (1972)
David L. Snyder*
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion that baseball has always been exempt from antitrust
laws is a commonly accepted postulate in sports law. This historical
overview traces the attempts to apply antitrust law to professional
baseball from the development of antitrust law and the reserve system
in baseball in the late 1800s, through the lineage of cases in the Twen-
tieth Century, ending with Flood v. Kuhn in 1972.1 A thorough exam-
ination of the case history suggests that baseball's so-called antitrust
"exemption" actually arose from a complete misreading of the Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs (1922)2 decision by the United States Supreme Court
in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc. (1953).3
The primary restriction upon player movement in professional base-
ball has been the reserve system, so at the outset, it is important to
trace the origins of this practice to understand how and why it
evolved.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE RESERVE SYSTEM
The earliest forms of player restraints in professional team sports
originated in baseball. The origins of professional baseball in the
* David L. Snyder is Full Professor in the Sport Management Department at the State Uni-
versity of New York at Cortland, and a part-time Associate Professor of Sport Management at
Tompkins Cortland Community College. He has been a member of the New York bar since
1986. The original concept for this article derives from the Sports Law class taught by William
"Buck" Briggs at Cornell University. The author would like to express his thanks and apprecia-
tion to Professor Briggs for giving his permission to incorporate several of his arguments into
this paper. The author would also like to recognize Neil F. Flynn, Esq., for reviewing this article
and for his helpful editorial comments and suggestions, and Michael A. Zitelli, an undergraduate
student at SUNY Cortland, who also made a significant contribution to this article.
1. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
2. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200 (1922).
3. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
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United States can be traced to the early to mid-1800s. 4 After the Civil
War, the sport experienced a period of dynamic growth, and as the
game developed into a business, professional players began to appear
and competitor leagues arose.5 Owners began to competitively bid
against each other in an effort to attract the best players to their
clubs.6 One of the more established professional leagues at the time
was the National Association of Base Ball Players (NABBP). 7
In 1869, the Cincinnati Red Stockings of the NABBP announced
that they would be fielding an entire team of paid professionals, thus
becoming the first "admittedly" all-professional club.8 That season,
Cincinnati went undefeated.9 The success of teams like the Red
Stockings inspired other teams to use the lure of money to induce the
best players to join their clubs.
In 1876, the NABBP became the National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs.10 Apprehensive that bidding wars for the best players
would continue to erupt among the teams in the league, the National
League owners developed a system in 1879 to restrict player move-
ment, which is colloquially referred to today as the "reserve system." II
The reserve system enabled each National League owner to secure the
exclusive rights to five players by placing their names on a reserve list
at the beginning of the season. The numbers were eventually in-
creased to include the entire roster. 12 This had a chilling impact on
player salaries, at least within the National League. Eventually, the
reserve system became embodied in the "option clause" of the Na-
tional League's Standard Player Contract. The option clause essen-
tially stated that when a player's contract expired, the team owner had
the right or option to bring the player back for another year under
certain stated terms. 13
4. David Q. Voigt, The History of Major League Baseball, in Total Baseball 7, 7-8 (John Thorn
& Pete Palmer eds. with David Reuther, 2d ed. 1991); Jerold J. Duquette, Regulating the Na-
tional Pastime: Baseball and Antitrust 2 (1999).
5. Voigt, supra note 4, at 10; Duquette, supra note 4, at 2.
6. Warren Goldstein, A History of Early Baseball: Playing for Keeps: 1857-1876 96 (1989)z
Duquette, supra note 4, at 2-3.
7. Goldstein, supra note 6, at 44-45; Voigt, supra, at 8; Duquette, supra note 4, at 2-3.
8. Roger I. Abrams, Legal Bases: Baseball and the Law 14 (1998); Goldstein, supra note 6, at
103; Voigt, supra note 4, at 8-9; Duquette, supra note 4, at 3.
9. Abrams, supra note 8, at 14; Voigt, supra note 4, at 9.
10. Abrams, supra note 8, at 10; Goldstein, supra note 6, at 5; Duquette, supra note 4, at 4.
11. Abrams, supra note 8, at 15; Goldstein, supra note 6, at 149-150; Duquette, supra note 4,
at 5.
12. Gary D. Hailey, Baseball and the Law, in Total Baseball 638, 638 (John Thorn & Pete
Palmer eds. with David Reuther, 2d ed. 1991): Abrams, supra note 8, at 15; Duquette, supra note
4, at 5.
13. Hailey, supra note 12, at 638-639; Abrams, supra note 8, at 46-47.
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The National League established itself as one of the most stable
professional baseball leagues in the late 1800s, although it was under
pressure from several competitor leagues, including the American As-
sociation, the Union Association, the Brotherhood of Professional
Base Ball Players, the Western League, and the Players League,
among others.14 At the turn of the century, the Western League, the
National League's chief rival, changed its name to the American
League.' 5 The struggle between these two dominant leagues ended in
1903 when the National and American Leagues merged with the sign-
ing of the National Agreement, creating the foundation for Major
League Baseball. Among other things, the National Agreement pro-
vided for an annual "World Series" between the top team from each
league, and required that all the teams in the newly formed league
agree to abide by the reserve system.'6
III. ANTITRUST LAW
Contemporaneous to these events occurring in baseball, there was a
movement within American jurisprudence to loosen the economic
stranglehold applied by large corporate trusts through the enactment
of laws designed to prohibit certain monopolistic practices. Antitrust
law, which arose during the late Nineteenth Century, sought to strike
a balance between the maintenance of the free market and monopo-
listic practices that might serve to impair the market's performance.
While seeking to preserve a capitalist economy, antitrust laws prohibit
price-fixing, cartels, output restrictions, blacklisting, and other monop-
olistic practices, which operate to the detriment of consumers. In es-
sence, these laws define the extent to which the branches of state and
federal government should intervene in the free market.' 7
The first primary source of antitrust law was the Sherman Antitrust
Act passed by Congress in 1890.18 The Sherman Act's legislative his-
tory from the late 1880s reveals that the statute arose from the per-
ceived need to control the massive corporate trusts that existed at that
time. The purposes of the Sherman Act were to preclude any single
entity from controlling the production, transportation and sale of the
necessities of life, and to prevent the autocratic dominance of trade by
those with the power to prevent competition or to fix the price of any
commodity. The legislative history of the Sherman Act makes no
14. Voigt, supra note 4, at 12-15; Abrams, supra note 8, at 16-25.
15. Voigt, supra note 4, at 16; Duquette, supra note 4, at 7.
16. Voigt, supra note 4, at 16-17; Duquette, supra note 4, at 8.
17. Abrams, supra note 8, at 48-49; Duquette, supra note 4, at 10-14.
18. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
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mention of professional baseball, or other professional sports.
Rather, the Sherman Act was the product of Congressional concerns
regarding the sugar, tobacco, railroad, and oil trusts that existed in the
late 1880s.19
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that, "Every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal." 20
Not all restraints of trade are unlawful under the Sherman Act. An
individual or single entity that achieves a full-fledged monopoly in a
particular trade or business without acting in concert with competitors
does not violate the law. In addition, monopolistic practices involving
purely intrastate trade are not illegal under the Sherman Act. Also,
while Section 1 of the Sherman Act indicates it applies to "every"
contract, combination and conspiracy, in application that was not the
case. In Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States (1911),21 the
Supreme Court held that Section 1 of the Sherman Act only bars
those relationships that "unreasonably" restrain trade. This ruling
laid the foundation for what would later develop into the Rule of Rea-
son analysis. Under the Rule of Reason, conspirators in a trust can
avoid antitrust sanctions by demonstrating the reasonableness of their
relationship or activity.
IV. AMERICAN LEAGUE BASEBALL CLUB OF CHICAGO V.
CHASE (1914)22
As baseball began to expand its business activities, questions re-
garding the applicability of antitrust law to professional baseball
arose. In 1914, Hal Chase 23 gave written notice to his team, the Chi-
19. Abrams, supra note 8, at 48-49; Duquette, supra note 4, at 10-14.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
21. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
22. American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct.
1914).
23. Chase, or as he was known, "Prince Hal," was one of the more colorful characters in
baseball lore. In Sports and the Law, Weiler and Roberts write: "The court refers to Hal Chase
as a 'special, unique, and extraordinary baseball player.' How extraordinary the judge simply did
not realize. In his definitive history of baseball, Harold Seymour characterizes Chase as a 'ma-
lignant genius." While only Lou Gehrig and George Sisler were comparable first basemen on
the field, Chase was the 'archetype of all crooked ballplayers . . . a full-fledged fixer and gam-
bler.' Indeed, at the end of the 1918 baseball season, Chase was charged by his manager, Hall of
Famer Christy Mathewson, with having tried to persuade his teammates to lose games on which
Chase had bets riding. Though three players on his team testified to this effect in a hearing
before the National League President, the President absolved Chase by saying that the players
had misunderstood the superstar-s joking comments. Chase returned to play for the Giants the
next season and to serve as the intermediary between the gamblers and the White Sox who were
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cago White Sox, that he was canceling his contract with them so he
could play for Buffalo in the Federal League. This was one of the first
examples of a "league jumping" case. Chase filed suit in the Supreme
Court in Erie County in New York. The issue in the Chase case was
whether the terms of the National Agreement between the National
and American Leagues violated the Sherman Act. As Judge Bissell
characterized it,
"The system created by 'organized baseball' in recent years presents
the question of the establishment of a scheme by which the personal
freedom, the right to contract for their labor wherever they will, of
10,000 skilled laborers, is placed under the dominion of a benevo-
lent despotism through the operation of the monopoly established
by the National Agreement." 24
In his decision, Judge Bissell declared,
"The analysis of the National Agreement and the Rules of the Com-
mission, controlling the services of these skilled laborers, and pro-
viding for their purchase, sale, exchange, draft, reduction, discharge,
and blacklisting, would seem to establish a species of quasi peonage
unlawfully controlling and interfering with the personal freedom of
the men employed. It appears that there is only one league of any
importance operating independently of the National Commission,
and that is the newly organized Federal League which comprises
eight clubs in eight cities. 'Organized baseball' is now as complete a
monopoly of the baseball business for profit as any monopoly can
be made. It is in contravention of the common law, in that it in-
vades the right to labor as a property right, in that it invades the
right to contract as a property right, and in that it is a combination
to restrain and control the exercise of a profession or calling. "25
However, although he found a monopoly to exist, Bissell deter-
mined that it was not in violation of the Sherman Act. "It is apparent
from the analysis already set forth of the agreement and rules forming
the combination of the baseball business, referred to as 'organized
baseball,' that a monopoly of baseball as a business has been inge-
niously devised and created in so far as a monopoly can be created
among free men;" he stated, "but I cannot agree to the proposition
that the business of baseball for profit is interstate trade or commerce,
and therefore subject to the provisions of the Sherman Act." 26
involved in the fixing of the 1919 World Series. Chase was indicted by a Chicago grand jury for
his role in this affair but the State of California refused to extradite him for trial." In Paul C.
Weiler & Gary R. Roberts, Sports and the Law: Text, Cases, Problem, 107 (1993).
24. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. at 19-20.
25. Id. at 17.
26. Id. at 16.
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So while the court in Chase determined that a cartel existed, it de-
cided that this monopolistic practice did not fall within the purview of
the Sherman Act because it was not a part of interstate commerce, it
was not on a large scale, and it did not involve commodities. In Chase,
"commerce" was narrowly defined as the "interchange of goods; mer-
chandise or property of any kind; trade; traffic; used more especially
of trade on a large scale . . ."27 The Chase court defined "commodity"
as "[t]hat which is useful; anything that is useful or serviceable; partic-
ularly an article of merchandise; anything moveable that is a subject of
trade or of acquisition." 2 8 Bissell continued,
"We are not dealing with the bodies of the players as commodities
or articles of merchandise, but with their services as retained or
transferred by the contract. The foundation of the National Agree-
ment is the game of baseball conducted as a profitable business, and
if this game were a commodity or an article of merchandise and
transported from state to state, then the argument of defendant's
counsel might be applicable." 29
Chase offered a very narrow, literal definition of commerce, goods,
production and trade.
The Chase court also stated, "Baseball is an amusement, a sport, a
game that comes clearly within the civil and criminal law of the state,
and it is not a commodity or an article of merchandise subject to the
regulation of Congress on the theory that it is interstate commerce."30
Chase reflects a certain judicial aversion to treating this "game" as
commerce, thereby making application of the Sherman Act to a base-
ball player improper.
Hal Chase eventually won his case and was freed from his contract,
but he prevailed under New York contract law, not under the Sher-
man Act. The next time the application of antitrust law to baseball
would be tested would be before the Supreme Court of the United
States.
V. FEDERAL BASEBALL CLUB OF BALTIMORE, INC. V. NATIONAL
LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS (1922)31
The merger between the American and National Leagues did not
put an end to the development of rival leagues, and in 1913, the Fed-
eral League was born. Founded and funded by a number of wealthy
27. Id. at 16.
28. Id. at 16.
29. Id. at 16.
30. Id. at 17.
31. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
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businessmen, the Federal League began to compete with the Major
Leagues for the best professional players. The Federal League was
moderately successful, but could not sustain itself against the com-
bined weight of the American and National Leagues. In 1914, the
Federal League sought a merger, but their request was not granted.
In 1915, the Federal League filed suit under the Sherman Act to have
the National Agreement between the National and American Leagues
declared invalid and to have all Standard Player Contracts of Major
League Baseball declared null and void.32
The case was tried in the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois before Judge Kennesaw Mountain Landis, who later
became baseball's first Commissioner. The Federal League needed a
quick decision because their operating funds were rapidly dwindling.
However, Landis delayed in making his determination for the entire
length of the 1915 baseball season until finally, the financially
strapped Federal League was forced into settling the case.3 3 Under
the terms of the settlement, certain Federal League owners were per-
mitted to purchase interests in existing clubs while others were bought
out, and players from the Federal League were allowed to rejoin pro-
fessional baseball without being blacklisted. Ultimately, Landis never
ruled on the case. 34
However, the matter was not completely resolved because one of
the Federal League teams, the Baltimore Terrapins, declined to join
the settlement agreement. The Terrapins had wanted to purchase the
St. Louis Cardinals and move them to Baltimore, but their proposal
was rejected. In March 1919, shortly after the peace agreement be-
tween the competing leagues was finalized, the Terrapins filed their
own lawsuit. It is this suit that has become commonly referred to as
the Federal Baseball case.35
In 1919, the case went to trial in Federal District Court. At the trial
court level, Judge Stafford instructed the jury,
"(a) That appellants were engaged in interstate commerce; (b) that
they attempted to monopolize, and did monopolize, a part of that
commerce, principally through what is called the 'reserve clause'
and ineligible list features of certain agreements; but (c) left it to the
jury to say whether the appellants had conspired together to de-
stroy, and did destroy, the Federal League, to the end that they
might perfect their monopoly of professional baseball, and whether,
32. Hailey, supra note 12, 640; Abrams, supra note 8, at 53-55.
33. Hailey, supra note 12, 640; Abrams, supra note 8, at 55.
34. Hailey, supra note 12, 640; Abrams, supra note 8, at 55-56.
35. Hailey, supra note 12, 640; Abrams, supra note 8, at 56.
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if they did so conspire with the effect stated, their act resulted in
injury to the appellee." 36
The jury awarded the Terrapins $80,000 trebled to $240,000, with costs
and attorneys' fees, on the grounds that the American and National
Leagues violated the Sherman Act.3 7
Citing with approval of the Chase case, 38 the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed using a Chase-type analysis. Listing numerous defi-
nitions of "trade" and "commerce" from various sources, the court
noted, "Through these definitions runs the idea that trade and com-
merce require the transfer of something, whether it be persons, com-
modities, or intelligence, from one place to another."39 The court held
that
"The business in which the appellants were engaged, as we have
seen, was the giving of exhibitions of baseball. A game of baseball
is not susceptible of being transferred. The players, it is true, travel
from place to place in interstate commerce, but they are not the
game.. . . Nothing is transferred in the process to those who patron-
ize it."4 0
The Circuit Court also found that professional baseball was not inter-
state commerce declaring that, "It is local in its beginning and in its
end." 4 1 The court took a narrow view of commerce consistent with
other early judicial interpretations.
In 1922, eight years after Chase, the Federal Baseball case finally
came before the Supreme Court. In a nine to zero decision (9-0), the
United States Supreme Court held that, "The business is giving exhi-
bitions of base ball, which are purely state affairs." 42 The decision
does not state, as many experts erroneously cite, that baseball is ex-
empt from the antitrust law. Indeed, the words "exempt" and "ex-
emption" never appear in Federal Baseball, nor does any similar
terminology. Rather, the Supreme Court, with the eminent Oliver
Wendell Holmes writing the decision, found that baseball is a purely
36. Nat'! League of Prof1 Baseball Clubs v. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, 269 F. 681, 684
(1920).
37. Id. at 682.
38. Id. at 686.
39. Id. at 684. It is interesting to note that the court allowed something intangible (i.e. intelli-
gence) to be included in its definition of commerce, thus arguably slightly broadening the previ-
ous definitions of commerce that limited the concept to tangible goods only.
40. Id. at 684-85.
41. Id. at 685.
42. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat'! League of Prof7 Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200, 208 (1922). (Hereinafter referred to as Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).)
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state affair. Therefore, since baseball was intrastate only, it was not
subject to the Sherman Act. 4 3
Although teams travel across state lines to play games, Justice
Holmes reasoned, "It is true that, in order to attain for these exhibi-
tions the great popularity that they have achieved, competitions must
be arranged between clubs from different cities and States. But the
fact that in order to give the exhibitions the Leagues must induce free
persons to cross state lines and must arrange and pay for their doing
so is not enough to change the character of the business." 4 4 Therefore,
the majority found interstate activity to be merely incidental to pro-
fessional baseball, and not the essential purpose of the league itself.
In rendering its decision, the Supreme Court greatly relied upon its
previous holding in Hooper v. California (1895),45 in which the court
found that the sale of insurance policies between states was not suffi-
cient to constitute interstate commerce.
Echoing the sentiments of the court in Chase, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Federal Baseball also found that baseball was not "trade" or
"commerce," as the terms were defined at the time. Holmes
explained,
"That to which it is incident, the exhibition, although made for
money would not be called trade or commerce in the commonly
accepted use of those words. As it is put by the defendants, per-
sonal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of commerce.
That which in its consummation is not commerce does not become
commerce among the States because the transportation that we
have mentioned takes place." 46
In that respect, the Supreme Court's ruling in Federal Baseball repre-
sents a rather typical turn of the century analysis of the applicability of
antitrust law to professional baseball.
In Federal Baseball, the Supreme Court never suggested that pro-
fessional baseball is exempt from antitrust law. Rather, they found
that professional baseball was not an interstate activity and it was not
"trade" or "commerce" as the terms were defined at that time, and
consequently, they held that baseball was not subject to antitrust legis-
lation by definition. 47
43. Justice Holmes considered the Sherman Act as a folly based on ignorance and he did not
believe the Act expressed the will of the people. He felt that capitalism operated best without
artificial legislative intervention.
44. Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. 200, 208-209 (1922).
45. Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895); Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922).
46. Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922).
47. Much has been made about the vote in this case being unanimous. It is very likely that
Justice Holmes' tremendous influence had a great deal to do with swaying certain judges to join
1852008]
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VI. DEVELOPMENTs AFTER FEDERAL BASEBALL
Antitrust law underwent some major revisions in the two decades
following the Supreme Court's decision in Federal Baseball. In re-
sponse to the economic crisis that led to The Great Depression, Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt conceived of the "The New Deal," which
consisted of a series of government initiatives designed to revitalize
the American economy. 48 Many of Roosevelt's early initiatives were
invalidated by the Supreme Court because of its narrow, restrictive
interpretation and application of the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution. 49 When Roosevelt threatened to pack the Su-
preme Court if the justices did not cooperate with his initiatives, the
high court tempered its stance.so Consequently, broader definitions of
interstate commerce, and the terms "trade" and "commerce," began
to emerge in the 1930s and 1940s.51
As a result of these changes, in 1944, the Hooper (1895) case that
the Supreme Court relied heavily upon in Federal Baseball was over-
turned in U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n (1944).52 When
Hooper was first decided, the Court found that insurance companies
were not engaged in interstate commerce, even if they cross state lines
to sell policies, because transportation across state lines was merely
incidental to the practice of selling insurance policies. However, in
South-Eastern Underwriters, the Supreme Court reversed its prior
holding in Hooper and held that the sale of insurance policies in more
than one jurisdiction did constitute interstate commerce.
Meanwhile, radio was transforming the sport and the way it was
experienced by spectators. In 1921, the first major league game was
broadcast from Pittsburgh on KDKA radio,53 and by 1939, all major
league teams were broadcasting their games over the radio.54 In the
process, this new technology had turned the National Pastime into a
in his opinion. However, in their handwritten notes to the original decision, three of the justices
expressed disagreement with Holmes and indicated that they thought that there might be certain
aspects of professional baseball that caused it to rise to the level of interstate commerce, yet they
hesitantly agreed to vote with him. Another justice kept wavering on the issue. Also, one of the
justices should have probably recused himself since his family had an ownership interest in a
professional baseball team. Given these facts, the vote could have easily been 4-4.
48. Basil Rauch, The History of the New Deal, Preface (Capricorn Books 1963) (1944).
49. Id. at 201.
50. Historical Dictionary of the New Deal: From Inauguration to Preparation for War 106-107
(James S. Olson ed., 1985).
51. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
52. U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
53. Paul D. Adomites, Baseball on Air, in Total Baseball 654, 654 (John Thorn & Pete Palmer
eds. with David Reuther, 2d ed. 1991).
54. Id. at 654-55.
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game that clearly crossed state boundaries. In addition, there were
new revenue streams generated from radio broadcasts of games.
More and more, professional baseball was becoming a business
enterprise.
By the 1940s, the definitions of "interstate commerce" and "trade"
had expanded; radio broadcasts of baseball games had increased dra-
matically; baseball had expanded as a business; and the Hooper case,
which figured so prominently in the decision in Federal Baseball, had
been overturned. The time seemed ripe to renew the argument that
antitrust law could be applied to professional baseball, and the person
who brought forth that issue was Danny Gardella.
VII. GARDELLA V. CHANDLER (1949)55
Since the demise of the Federal League in 1916, baseball did not
have to contend with challenges from rival leagues until 1946, when
several players left the Major Leagues to play in a professional base-
ball league in Mexico after being enticed by lucrative offers from
Mexican League president, executive chairman, and commissioner,
Jorge Pasquel. 56 Gardella was one of approximately two-dozen play-
ers,57 which included Max Lanier, Vern Stephens, and Sal Maglie,
among others,58 known as the "Mexican Jumping Beans."59 After the
Mexican League collapsed, Gardella and the others tried to return to
the Major Leagues, but the Commissioner of Baseball, A. B. "Happy"
Chandler, banned the players from Major League Baseball for five
years.60
Gardella filed an antitrust suit under the Sherman Act. Attorney
Frederic A. Johnson, a former classmate of Chandler's, who had writ-
ten the first scholarly article on baseball and the law in 1939, repre-
sented Gardella.6 1 At the Federal District Court level, Judge
Goddard dismissed the suit on the pleadings based on Federal Base-
55. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
56. John Phillips, The Mexican Jumping Beans: The Story of the Baseball War of 1946, Volume
1 (1997).
57. John Phillips, The Mexican Jumping Beans: The Story of the Baseball War of 1946, Volume
2: The Statistics 41 (2003).
58. Marvin Miller, A Whole Different Ball Game: The Sport and Business of Baseball 176
(Carol Publishing Group 1991); Phillips, supra note 57, at Preface.
59. Phillips, supra note 56, at 13 (discussing how Gardella was another colorful character. He
left for Mexico after getting into a dispute with Giants owners, for whom he played, over the
wearing of a necktie. The team required one, but he didn't want to wear it).
60. Hailey, supra note 12, at 641; Phillips, supra note 56, at 46.
61. Phillips, supra note 56, at 66 (discussing that Johnson was a former classmate of Happy
Chandler at Harvard. Some accounts claim they were good friends and possibly colluded on the
settlement, while others say they were bitter rivals).
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ball.6 2 In a 2-1 decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals over-
turned Goddard's holding, with judicial heavyweights Learned Hand
and Jerome Frank in the majority.
In arriving at its decision, the Circuit Court stressed the changes
that had occurred since Federal Baseball. In no uncertain terms, Judge
Frank stated in his opinion, "No one can treat as frivolous the argu-
ment that the Supreme Court's recent decisions have completely de-
stroyed the vitality of Federal Baseball Club v. National League ...
decided twenty-seven years ago, and have left that case but an impo-
tent zombi." 63 Judge Frank found that the changes that had occurred
involving radio and television broadcasts of games had clearly trans-
formed professional baseball into an interstate activity. Frank said,
"In that earlier case (i.e. Federal Baseball), the Court held that the
traveling across state lines was but an incidental means of enabling
games to be played locally - i.e., within particular states - and
therefore insufficient to constitute interstate commerce. Here, al-
though the playing of the games is essential to both defendants' in-
tra-state and interstate activities, the interstate communication by
radio and television is in no way a means, incidental or otherwise, of
performing the intra-state activities (the local playings of the
games). "64
Learned Hand also emphasized the significance of broadcasting the
games on radio and television in terms of interstate commerce, noting,
". . . the situation appears to me the same as that which would exist at
a "ball-park" where a state line ran between the diamond and the
grandstand. "65
In reference to Judge Bissell's earlier remark in the Chase case that
professional baseball had established a system of "quasi-peonage,"
Baseball Commissioner Chandler scoffed that it was hard to see how
players making so much money could be regarded as peons. Frank
forcefully addressed this remark in his opinion in Gardella stating, "I
may add that, if the players be regarded as quasi-peons, it is of no
moment that they are well paid; only the totalitarian-minded will be-
lieve that high pay excuses virtual slavery." 66
Again using some very strong words, Judge Frank concluded,
62. Gardella v. Chandler, 79 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), rev'd, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
63. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 408-09 (2d Cir. 1949).
64. Id. at 410-11.
65. Id. at 407. In fact, there is a minor league team for the Baltimore Orioles in Bluefield,
West Virginia in which a state line literally runs through the ball park. Part of the park is in the
State of Virginia and part is in West Virginia.
66. Id. at 410.
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"Defendants suggest that 'organized baseball,' which supplies mil-
lions of Americans with desirable diversion, will be unable to exist
without the 'reserve clause.' Whether that is true, no court can pre-
dict. In any event, the answer is that the public's pleasure does not
authorize the courts to condone illegality, and that no court should
strive ingeniously to legalize a private (even if benevolent)
dictatorship." 67
The case was remanded to Judge Goddard for trial. After the deci-
sion of the Second Circuit, a few other "Mexican Jumping Beans,"
including players Fred Martin and Max Lanier, hired their own attor-
neys and joined the suit.68 Fearful of an unfavorable outcome that
could result in the establishment of an adverse precedent, Major
League Baseball reinstated the players on June 6, 1949, and settled the
case with Gardella on October 7 of that same year. 69 On the rein-
statement, Gardella's attorney commented, "Baseball has seen the
handwriting on the wall. That is the reason for the reinstatement of
these players."70
The real significance of Gardella was that it suggested that antitrust
might be applied to professional baseball if the issue made it back to
the U. S. Supreme Court. The opportunity arose in 1953 with the
Toolson case.
VIII. ToOLSON v. NEW YORK YANKEES (1953)71
George H. Toolson was a minor leaguer in the Yankees' system dur-
ing the early 1950s when the Yankees were packed with star players.
Organizationally, the member clubs in professional baseball had a sys-
tem of horizontal stratification that prohibited players from moving
from one team to another, which was embodied in the reserve system.
But the structure of Major League Baseball was also vertically strati-
fied through the minor league system. Branch Rickey developed the
modern farm system in 1936.72 Through it, each club had a fully de-
67. Id. at 415.
68. Miller, supra note 58, at 179; Phillips, supra note 56, at 67-68 (stating that in April of 1949
following the Circuit Court's decision, baseball mogul Branch Rickey told a congressional panel
that Gardella and other players who opposed baseball's reserve system "lean toward
communism").
69. Hailey, supra note 12, at 641 (explaining that in a published interview, Gardella later said
that he settled for $60,000 and the opportunity to return to Major League Baseball); Phillips,
supra note 56, at 68-69, 71 (explaining that later in life, Gardella reflected about the lawsuit
saying, "I feel I let the whole world know that the reserve clause was unfair. It had the odor of
peonage, even slavery").
70. Phillips, supra note 56, at 68.
71. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
72. Bob Hoie, The Farm System, in Total Baseball, 644, 646 (John Thorn & Pete Palmer eds.
with David Reuther, 2d ed. 1991).
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veloped minor league system for the development of players with
teams in various cities, and the parent clubs controlled the players in
their minor league system.73
The Yankees had directed Toolson to report from their minor
league club in Newark to their farm team in Binghamton, but he re-
fused to go. Toolson's position was that although he was a talented
ball player, and because the Yankees were overloaded with talent at
that time, he was never going to have an opportunity to make the big
leagues. As a result of his refusal to report to Binghamton, Toolson
was placed on the ineligible list and barred from playing elsewhere. 74
Upon being notified of his ineligibility, he filed an antitrust suit in
federal court.
His case was dismissed without a trial by District Court Judge Har-
rison. Judge Harrison stated, "To me, the simple issue of this case is
whether the game of baseball is 'trade or commerce' within the mean-
ing of the Anti-Trust Acts, and whether the structure known as 'Or-
ganized Baseball' is engaged in such trade or commerce."75 However,
Judge Harrison refrained from adjudicating the matter, commenting
that, "If Federal Baseball is, as Judge Frank intimates, 'an impotent
zombi,' I feel that it is not my duty to so find but that the Supreme
Court should so declare."76 Implying that perhaps the matter should
be left for Congress to resolve, Judge Harrison observed, "It is a mat-
ter of common knowledge that the status of organized baseball is the
subject of a congressional hearing and it (i.e. Congress) may pass leg-
islation that will be determinative of the issue before this court. I be-
lieve it is my clear duty to endeavor to be a judge and should not
assume the function of a pseudo legislator."77 The Court of Appeals
affirmed on the same grounds and for the same reasons.78
The case went up to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1953. The Supreme
Court, in a one-paragraph, per curiam opinion, upheld Federal Base-
ball by a 7-2 vote and affirmed the decisions of the two lower courts
finding that:
In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Profes-
sional Baseball Clubs, 259 U. S. 200 (1922), this Court held that the
business of providing public baseball games for profit between clubs
73. Id. at 646.
74. Hailey, supra note 12, at 642.
75. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 101 F. Supp. 93, 95 (S.D. Cal. 1951), affd, 200 F.2d 198 (9th
Cir. (Cal.) Dec. 12, 1952), cert. granted, 345 U.S. 963 (1953), affd, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
76. Id. at 95.
77. Id.
78. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 200 F. 2d 198, 199 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. granted, 345 U.S. 963
(1953), affd, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
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of professional baseball players was not within the scope of the fed-
eral antitrust laws. Congress has had the ruling under consideration
but has not seen fit to bring such business under these laws by legis-
lation having prospective effect. The business has thus been left for
thirty years to develop, on the understanding that it is not subject to
existing antitrust legislation. The present cases79 ask us to overrule
the prior decision and, with retrospective effect, hold the legislation
applicable. We think that if there are evils in this field which now
warrant application to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legisla-
tion. Without re-examination of the underlying issues, the judg-
ments below are affirmed on the authority of Federal Baseball Club
of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
supra, so far as that decision determines that Congress had no inten-
tion of including the business of baseball within the scope of the
federal antitrust laws."
While it is not as well recognized as Federal Baseball, the "Mexican
Jumping Beans" case, or the Flood case, a compelling claim could be
made that Toolson is the pivotal case in the baseball and antitrust line-
age. For the first time in this entire line of cases, there is language that
could be interpreted as suggesting that baseball is exempt from anti-
trust laws.
As Justice Harold Burton noted in his dissent, joined by Justice
Reed, the portion of the last line of the majority's decision in Toolson,
in which the Court found that Congress "had no intention of including
the business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust
laws,"81 is simply incorrect. Neither the Sherman Act, nor the legisla-
tive history of the statute, supports this assertion.82 Justice Burton re-
marked, "In the Federal Baseball Club case the Court did not state
that even if the activities of organized baseball amounted to interstate
trade or commerce those activities were exempt from the Sherman
Act."83 Burton continued, "Congress, however, has enacted no ex-
press exemption of organized baseball from the Sherman Act, and no
court has demonstrated the existence of an implied exemption from
that Act of any sport that is so highly organized as to amount to an
79. There were a number of cases challenging baseball's reserve clause that were
consolidated.
80. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 356-57 (1953).
81. Id. at 357.
82. Abrams, supra note 8, at 59 (noting that "The legislative history of the antitrust laws - the
Sherman Act in 1890 and the Clayton Antitrust Act in 1914 - is thin. Congress was concerned
with the growing power of monopolies, particularly those that eliminated competition in indus-
trial America. There is no evidence that any member of Congress even thought about the base-
ball enterprise. If there was a special antitrust exemption for baseball, it was one the Supreme
Court would have to divine from the words of the statutes, because Congress never considered
the question").
83. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 356.
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interstate monopoly or which restrains interstate trade or
commerce." 84
In holding that professional baseball was not within the scope of
antitrust law, the Supreme Court in Toolson completely misapplied
the precedent of Federal Baseball, which only stood for the proposi-
tion that antitrust law did not apply to baseball because the activity
involved was not interstate commerce, and because baseball as it ex-
isted at that time could not be considered "trade" or "commerce." In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Burton gave considerable attention to
the dramatic increase in radio and television revenues in professional
baseball since the time of Federal Baseball, thereby justifying from his
perspective, the applicability of antitrust laws to baseball. 5
The Supreme Court's rationale that because professional baseball
was allowed to develop for thirty years without the scrutiny of anti-
trust legislation provides little justification not to apply antitrust law
to baseball in 1953, especially given the changes that had occurred
since Federal Baseball. By contrast, although the insurance industry
had not been subject to antitrust law for nearly fifty years following
the Supreme Court's original decision in Hooper (1895),86 that did not
prevent the Court from reversing its decision and subjecting the inter-
state sale of insurance to antitrust scrutiny in South-Eastern Under-
writers (1944).7
The Supreme Court in Toolson seemed content to leave the issue of
the applicability of antitrust law to professional baseball to Congress,
and it refused to re-examine Federal Baseball. Paradoxically, in 1954,
the same Supreme Court that decided Toolson also decided Brown v.
Board of Education,88  instantly reversing over fifty years of
precedent.89
As distinguished jurist Henry J. Friendly diplomatically put it years
later, "We freely acknowledge our belief that Federal Baseball was not
one of Mr. Justice Holmes' happiest days, that the rationale of Tool-
son is extremely dubious and that, to use the Supreme Court's own
adjectives, the distinction between baseball and other professional
sports is 'unrealistic,' 'inconsistent' and 'illogical.' "90 Nevertheless,
84. Id. at 364.
85. Id. at 359.
86. Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895).
87. U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n , 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
88. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
89. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393
(1856).
90. Salerno v. Am. League of Profl Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d. 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970).
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while antitrust law was deemed to apply to other professional sports,
with regard to baseball, stare decisis was the prevailing rule.91
The next legal challenge to baseball's reserve system would come
about twenty years later, on the heels of a decade of great social tur-
bulence and transition, with the Flood (1972) case.
IX. FLOOD v. KUHN (1972)92
Curt Flood was a twelve-year veteran centerfielder for the St. Louis
Cardinals. He was a superb fielder, earning seven straight Gold
Gloves during the 1960s. He also was an excellent hitter, especially
considering the majority of his career was played during the 1960s, an
era in which the rules heavily favored pitchers. Flood helped the
Cardinals to three pennants and two world championships during his
tenure in St. Louis.93
In October of 1969, after the New York Mets won the World Series,
Flood received a call that he had been traded to the Philadelphia Phil-
lies. An embittered Flood later reflected on the incident, "If I had
been a foot-shuffling porter, they might have at least given me a
pocket watch. But all I got was a call from a middle-echelon coffee
drinker in the front office." 94
In his autobiography, Flood described his predicament, as he
viewed it. "A salesman reluctant to transfer from one office to an-
other may choose to seek employment on the sales force of a different
firm. A plumber can reject the dictates of his boss without relinquish-
ing his right to plumb elsewhere. At the expiration of one contract, an
actor shops among producers for the best arrangement he can find.
But the baseball monopoly offers no such option to the athlete. If he
elects not to work for the corporation that 'owns' his service, baseball
forbids him to ply his trade at all. In the hierarchy of living things, he
ranks with poultry."95
Flood refused to accept his trade from St. Louis to Philadelphia and
he decided to file an antitrust suit challenging baseball's reserve sys-
tem. He sent a letter to Commissioner Bowie Kuhn stating, "After
91. Ironically, the case was argued in August of 1953, the same time the Yankees were in the
process of winning their 5th consecutive World Series, which tended to support Toolson's claim
that he had no hope of making the club.
92. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
93. David Snyder & Michael A. Zitelli, The Case for Curt Flood, in Mound City Memories in
St. Louis, 16, 16-20 (Bob Tiemann, ed. 2007). For an outstanding biography of Curt Flood, see
Brad Snyder, A Well Paid Slave: Curt Flood's Fight for Free Agency in Professional Sports
(2006).
94. Curt Flood, The Way It Is 187 (1970).
95. Id. at 15.
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twelve years in the major leagues, I do not feel that I am a piece of
property to be bought and sold irrespective of my wishes." 9 6 Coming
from an African American at the height of the Civil Rights move-
ment, a defiant statement such as this carried tremendous social
resonance.
Kuhn believed his role, as the patriarch of baseball, was to preserve
the best interests of the game, which he felt meant preserving the re-
serve system at all costs. Yet, as reflected in his response to Flood,
Kuhn seemed to be completely oblivious to the dynamic social cur-
rents and internal turmoil that surrounded him. Kuhn wrote back, "I
certainly agree with you that you, as a human being, are not a piece of
property to be bought and sold. That is fundamental in our society
and I think obvious. However, I cannot see its applicability to the
situation at hand."97 Even years later when he reflected in his
memoirs on his years as Commissioner, Kuhn seemingly failed to
grasp the complex factors that ultimately and inevitably led to the es-
tablishment of free agency in baseball.98
Marvin Miller, the Executive Director for the Baseball Players' As-
sociation at the time, warned Flood of the consequences of his actions.
Miller later wrote,
"I had a lot of respect for Curt as a ballplayer, but I didn't know
how well he knew the owners. 'In some ways,' I told him, 'you
know those guys better than I do, but on the other hand I've
learned a lot in dealing with them over the last three years, and if
you don't know it, I can tell you I've learned that they are a mean,
vindictive bunch. If they think you're endangering their monopoly,
they'll do anything they can to destroy you in baseball. I'm not call-
ing them racists - not all of them, anyway - but being black isn't
going to help you with them. If you win, you might be too old to
come back, and if you lose, you'll certainly be blacklisted. Let me
put it to you the simplest way possible: The way I see it, the moment
you file that suit, you're probably through in baseball.' "9
Despite Miller's warnings, Flood did not waver in his convictions. "I
hadn't thought about it," Flood replied, "But if that's the way it is,
okay, I'll live with that and deal with it somehow."100
96. Flood, supra note 94, at 194; see also Bowie Kuhn, Hardball 83 (1987) and Miller, supra
note 58, at 190-91.
97. Kuhn, supra note 96, at 83, Miller, supra note 58, at 191.
98. Miller, supra note 58, at 85.
99. Id. at 181.
100. Id. at 181.
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The case was filed in January of 1970. Flood chose former Supreme
Court Justice and former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Ar-
thur Goldberg, to represent him.101
In March 1970, Judge Irving Ben Cooper denied Flood's motion for
a preliminary injunction. "To put it mildly and with restraint," main-
tained Judge Cooper, "it would be unfortunate indeed if a fine sport
and profession, which brings surcease from daily travail and an escape
from the ordinary to most inhabitants of this land, were to suffer in
the least because of undue concentration by any one or any group on
commercial and profit considerations. The game is on a higher
ground; it behooves every one to keep it there." 0 2 On the delicate
issue of whether Major League Baseball was a business, Cooper
opined, "Baseball's status in the life of the nation is so pervasive that
it would not strain credulity to say the Court can take judicial notice
that baseball is everybody's business." 0 3
The district court trial ran from May 19, 1970 to June 10, 1970, and
was decided in August that same year. In the subsequent opinion,
Judge Cooper noted that even the plaintiff's witnesses testified that
the reserve system was not entirely undesirable, and in fact, much of it
was necessary and beneficial. 104 Cooper stated his belief that "negoti-
ations [i.e. collective bargaining] could produce an accommodation on
the reserve system which would be eminently fair and equitable to all
concerned," 0 5 and that "the reserve clause can be fashioned so as to
find acceptance by player and club." to6 Holding that Federal Baseball
and Toolson were controlling, Cooper found that baseball was exempt
from federal antitrust laws, and consequently, state antitrust laws must
also be inapplicable to baseball by implication to avoid "diversity of
treatment." 0 7
In 1971, the Circuit Court affirmed the district court's decision. In
his concurring opinion, Judge Moore, while lionizing the game of pro-
101. Kuhn, supra note 96, at 82; Flood, supra note 94, 194; Miller, supra note 58, at 187-89.
102. Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
103. Id.
104. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 275-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (explaining that in his book
Baseball's Reserve System: The Case and Trial of Curt Flood v. Major League Baseball (2006),
author and attorney Neil Flynn suggests that the case that was presented for Flood was actually
the union's case, and not Flood's case. Bowie Kuhn went even further in Hardball stating that,
in his opinion, Miller used Flood for the union's purposes. Kuhn, supra note 96, at 80. While he
feels Miller was as honest and candid with Flood as he could be about the potential outcome of
his case, Flynn further speculates that perhaps the case may have had a different outcome had it
been approached differently).
105. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
106. Id. at 284.
107. Id. at 280.
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fessional baseball, characterized it as essentially a benevolent oligar-
chy. He expressed his view that, "In short, organized baseball existed
almost as an enclave or feudal barony throughout the years, managing
its own affairs as best calculated to preserve the sport and maintaining
its own officialdom for self-regulation purposes - and except for the
brief scandal of the so-called Chicago Black Sox in 1919, apparently
has handled its little kingdom and its subjects very well.""', Moore
summed up his assessment of the situation by concluding, "Therefore,
without any reservations or doubts as to the soundness of Federal
Baseball and Toolson, I would affirm the decision below on all four
counts and would limit the participation of the courts in the conduct
of baseball's affairs to the throwing out by the Chief Justice (in the
absence of the President) of the first ball of the baseball season.""' 9
The Supreme Court chose to grant certiorari. Justice Harry Black-
mun wrote the decision for the majority, calling Major League Base-
ball an established aberration.o10 Perplexingly, the Court did not
overturn Federal Baseball, even though it specifically found that "Pro-
fessional baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate
commerce.""'
In a book entitled The Brethren, authors Bob Woodward and Scott
Armstrong describe the inner workings of the Supreme Court, as
gleaned from interviews with the law clerks of the various Justices.112
The following account from The Brethren gives a detailed, behind-the-
scenes account of the process the Court underwent in arriving at its
decision in the Flood case. This passage has been included in its en-
tirety because this excerpt vividly portrays the bizarre machinations
that sometimes sway legal opinions, even at the highest level.
Earlier at the March 24 conference, Stewart had found himself the
senior member of a majority for the first time in his career. The case
(Flood v. Kuhn) concerned Curt Flood, a former star outfielder for
the Cardinals who refused to be traded to the Philadelphia Phillies.
He had filed an antitrust suit against professional baseball. Flood
wanted to break the reserve clause that allowed teams to trade play-
ers without their consent.
Oral argument had failed to clarify the issues. Former Justice Ar-
thur Goldberg, in his first appearance before the Court since re-
signing in 1965, had offered such a poor presentation of Flood's
case, that his former colleagues were embarrassed.
108. Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F. 2d 264, 270 (2d Cir. 1971).
109. Id. at 273.
110. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
111. Id. at 282.
112. Bob Woodard & Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court (1979).
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Powell withdrew from the case, because he held stock in Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., whose principle owner, August Busch, Jr., also owned
the St. Louis Cardinals. The Chief, Douglas and Brennan voted for
Flood, leaving Stewart to assign the opinion for a five-member
majority.
Stewart thought that the opinion would be easy to write. The court
had twice before decided that baseball was exempt from the anti-
trust law. It was, Stewart said, "a case of 'stare decisis' double dip-
ped." There seemed little chance of losing the majority as long as
the two earlier precedents were followed. He assigned the opinion
to Blackmun.
Blackmun was delighted. Apart from the abortion assignment, he
felt that he had suffered under the Chief, receiving poor opinions to
write, including more than his share of tax law and Indian cases. He
thought that if antitrust laws were applied to baseball, its unique
position as the national pastime would be undermined. A devote
fan of the Chicago Cubs, and later the Minnesota Twins, he wel-
comed his chance to be one of the boys.
With his usual devotion to detail, Blackmun turned to the Baseball
Encyclopedia, which he kept on the shelf behind his desk. He set
minimum lifetime performance standards - numbers of games
played, lifetime batting averages or earned-run averages. He picked
out representative stars from each of the teams, positions, and de-
cades of organized baseball. Then, closeted away in the Justices'
library, Blackmun wrote an opening section that was and ode to
baseball. In three extended paragraphs, he traced the history of
professional baseball. He continued with a list of "the many
names, celebrated for one reason or another, that have sparked the
diamond and its environs and that have provided timber for recap-
tured thrills, for reminiscence and comparisons, and for conversa-
tion and anticipation in season and off season: Ty Cobb, Babe Ruth
. . ." There were more than seventy names. "The list seems end-
less," Blackmun wrote. He paid homage to the verse "Casey at the
Bat," and other baseball literature. When he had finished, Black-
mun circulated his draft.
Brennan was surprised. He thought Blackmun had been in the li-
brary researching the abortion cases, not playing with baseball
cards.
One of Rehnquist's clerks called Blackmun's chambers and joked
that Camillo Pascual, a former Washington Senators pitcher, should
have been included on the list of greats.
Blackmun's clerk phoned back the next day. "The Justice recalls
seeing Pascual pitch and remembers his fantastic curve ball. But he
pulled out his Encyclopedia and looked up his record. He decided
Pascual's 174 wins were not enough. It is difficult to make these
judgments of who to include but Justice Blackmun felt that Pascual
is just not in the same category with Christy Matthewson's 373 wins.
I hope you will understand."
Calling Blackmun's chambers to request that some favorite player
be included became a new game for the clerks.
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Stewart was embarrassed that he had assigned the opinion to Black-
mun. He tried to nudge him into recognizing the inappropriateness
of the opening section, jokingly telling him he would go along with
the opinion if Blackmun would add a member of Stewart's home-
town team, the Cincinnati Reds.
Blackmun added a Red.
Marshall registered his protest. The list included no black baseball
players. Blackmun explained that most of the players on his list
antedated World War II. Blacks had been excluded from the major
leagues until 1947.
That was the point exactly, Marshall replied.
Three black players were added - Jackie Robinson, Roy
Campanella, and Satchel Paige.
Marshall decided to switch anyhow and write his own opinion in
Flood's favor. The Court was now split 4 to 4, and word circulated
that White was considering following Marshall. That would give
him a majority.
White owed a great deal to professional sports. His career in foot-
ball had paid for a first-rate law school education. He remembered
the years he had spent touring the country playing football. In
those days, teams were real teams, brotherhoods of young men. It
was different now. There were too many prima donnas, concerned
only with their own statistics. White had difficulty feeling sorry for
Curt Flood, who had turned down a $100,000 annual salary.
The antitrust issues were not easy in the case. White thought that if
federal laws did not apply, state antitrust laws might. His clerks
used his hesitation to negotiate small changes in the Marshall opin-
ion. White would probably join if the changes were made, one clerk
offered.
When Marshall balked at a change that seemed trivial, his clerk pro-
tested that it was necessary to get White's vote.
"Says who?" Marshall asked.
A White clerk, he was told.
"He'll never join," Marshall responded.
Finally, White indicated he would stay with Blackmun's opinion
against Flood. But he flatly refused to join the section listing the
baseball greats.
Blackmun ignored the insult. He still had four votes. If the tie
stood, no opinion would be published.
At the end of May, Powell's clerks made a last-ditch effort to get
him back in the case. They know that he favored Flood's position.
Since he would be voting against the major leagues, he could not be
accused of a conflict of interest, his clerks argued. He would only
be hurting his own interests. It was in fact possible that he could be
accused of a conflict if he did not vote.
No, Powell told them. He was out and he would stay out.
The Court was still deadlocked in the last half of May. After all his
work, it seemed that Blackmun was to be deprived his opinion.
The Chief's Saturday visit to Blackmun, and Blackmun's subse-
quent withdrawal of the abortion opinion, had spawned vicious ru-
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mors among the clerks of vote trading. Then, when the term drew to
a close, Burger announced that he would switch to the Blackmun
opinion in the Flood case, giving him the fifth vote. He too, how-
ever, initially declined to join the first section.
After the opinion had come down, a clerk asked Blackmun why he
hadn't included Mel Ott, the famous New York Giants right fielder
on his list of baseball greats.
Blackmun had insisted that he had included Ott.
The clerk said that the name was not in the printed opinion.
Blackmun said he would never forgive himself.' 13
This account suggests that the Supreme Court had completely lost
sight of the factual, legal and conceptual underpinnings of Federal
Baseball. As author Roger Abrams observed, "Considered as a
whole, Blackmun's majority opinion may have confused the business
of baseball with the glorious game of baseball, the national pastime
wrapped in legend and myth that began with the Cooperstown
saga."ll 4 Abrams also commented, "Marshall's dissent skillfully dis-
sected the majority opinion - admittedly, not a very difficult task."115
The case was supposedly determined solely on the basis of stare de-
cisis, yet as the highest court in the land, the Supreme Court is free to
re-evaluate its prior decisions. In fact, just two years before Flood was
decided, the same Supreme Court reviewed another antitrust case in
which it quoted with approval Justice Felix Frankfurter who had writ-
ten, "[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical
formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and ques-
tionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine
more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by ex-
perience."I 16 Even Oliver Wendell Holmes, the author of Federal
Baseball, wrote of stare decisis, "It is revolting to have no better rea-
son for a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of Henry
IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid
down have vanished long since, and that rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past." 17
These examples to the contrary, the Court refused to interfere with
the nation's pastime. Free agency would come to baseball, although
not through the Flood case. However, many commentators have
credited Flood as serving as a catalyst for the major structural changes
that occurred in professional baseball during the 1970s.
113. Id. at 189-192.
114. Abrams, supra note 8, at 67.
115. Id.
116. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241 (1970). The ma-
jority even cited this case in Flood at 283.
117. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1887).
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X. CONCLUSION
There have been a number of developments since Flood v. Kuhn.
Free agency was achieved in baseball through arbitration 18 and Con-
gress limited the application of antitrust to the Major Leagues through
the enactment of a statute named after the Cardinal's centerfielder." 9
Case law continues to define the parameters of the antitrust "exemp-
tion" in baseball.121) These subjects have proven to be ample sources
of research of their own.
However, the cases reviewed in this article still have great signifi-
cance and instructional value by helping to clarify prior misunder-
standings surrounding the evolution of baseball's purported antitrust
''exemption," and by bringing together some important background
information that might help frame these cases within the context of
their times.
118. Natl & Am. Leagues of Prof Baseball Clubs v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n
(John A. Messersmith & David A. McNally), Grievance Nos. 75-27 & 75-28, Decision No. 29
(Dec. 23, 1975, Opinion of the Impartial Chairman Peter Seitz).
119. Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub L. No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824, January 27, 1998.
120. See Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993); see also But-
terworth v. Natl League of Profl Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994); see also New
Orleans Pelicans Baseball Club, Inc. v. NatTl Ass'n of Profl1 Baseball Leagues, Inc., 1994 WL
631144 (E.D. La. 1994); see also Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 663 Fla. App 553 (1995); see
also McCoy v. Major League Baseball, 911 F. Supp. 454 (W.D. Wash. 1995); see also Minn. Twins
P'ship v. State by Hatch, 592 N.W. 2d 847 (Minn. 1999).
